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the Baptist Association z. Hart's Executors has given occasion.' . . . In eight States, therefore, the law of charitable uses is held, as it is held in Pennsylvania, and I cannot but regard it as a public misfortune to those States
where it is held otherwise." 2
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SYLLABUS.
The engineer of a railroad company, while driving his locomotive
through a crowded portion of a large city at a rate of speed greatly in
excess of that allowed by ordinance of the city, struck and killed a young
boy, who was atrespasser. The tracks of the company at the place where
the accident occurred, were laid on ground belonging to the company,'
but they were not fenced in, and on each side of them was a public way.
The engineer could have seen the boy when one hundred and twenty-five
feet away from him, but no bell was rung, and, according to the weight of
the testimony, no whistle was blown until the locomotive was but a few
feet from the boy. Held: That it was for the jury to say whether under
the circumstances the engineer was guilty of such wanton and wilful negligence as would allow plaintiff, the administrator of the boy, to recover
damages in spite of the contributory negligence of the boy.
, STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Appeal from the Appellate Court of the First District.
This was an action on the case brought by Philip
IMr. Binney here says: "In Massachusetts there are, beside the prior
cases of Bartlett v. King's Executors, 15 Mass., 537, and Trustees of
Phillips' Academy v. King's Executors, 15 Mass., 537, the case of Goring
v. Emery, 16 Pick., 107; Burbank v. Whitney, 24 Pick., 146, and Bartlett
v. Nye, 4 Metcalfe, 378. In Maine, Shapley v. Nissbury, i Greenl., 271.
In Vermont, Burr's Executors v. Smith, 7 Verm. Rep., 241. InNewYork,
Coggeshall v. Nelton, 7 John Ch. Rep., 292; McCartie v. Orphans' Asylum, 9 Cowen, 437; Baptist Church of Hartford v. Witherill, 3 Paige,
3co; King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw., 79; Potter v. Chapin, 6 Paige, 640;
Reformed Dutch Church v. Mott, i Paige, 77 ; Pearsall v. Poast, 2o Wendell, 11g, and Wright v. Trustees Methodist Episcopal Church, i Hoff,
In NewJersey, Ackerman's Executors v. Legatees cited in the report
302.
of Shopwell v. Hendrickson, Vol. III, 9, which is itself a full authority for
the same doctrine. In North Carolina, Griffin v. Graham, i Hawks, 96.
in Ohio, McIntyre Poor School v. Zauesville Canal Co., 9 Ohio, 203."
!Argument of H. Binney, Girard's Will Case, p. 185.
3 29

Njrtbeastern Reporter. 692, decided Jan. 18, 1892.
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Bodemer, as administrator of the estate of his son, Philip
Bodemer, Jr., to recover damages for the death of the latter.
The facts of the case were as follows: At the place where
the accident happened the tracks of the appellant ran north
and south at right angles to Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth
Streets, along Clark Street, in the city of Chicago, on ground
owned by the defendant. On each side of the tracks was
a public way ten feet wide, and the tracks were not fenced
in. The tracks were crossed by Twenty-fifth and Twentysixth Streets, on which there was much travel at the locality
in question. The deceased, a boy about nine years old,
and his brother, about twelve years old, came to Twenty-filt-h
Street from the east at the time of the accident, which cost
decedent his life, to cross the tracks there. A long and noisy
freight train was going southward on one of the eastern
tracks, and the boys walked southward along the alley east
of the track till the last car of the freight train had passed.
The elder brother then crossed the tracks in safety, going
to the west, but his younger brother, while attempting to
follow, was struck and killed by the engine of a passenger
train going at a high rate of speed to the north on one of
the tracks west of the one on which the freight train had
just passed.
The only count in the declaration that was left to the
jury alleged that the defendant was driving its locomotive
toward a certain point on its railroad near the crossing of
Twenty-fifth Street; and while the deceased, who was a
minor under the age of ten years, was
"then and there, at said aforementioned point upon said railroad, attempting to cross said railroad," the engineer, although he knew that persons
were in the habit of passing across and along the track at and near said
place, between Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Streets, "and although,
whileat a great distance from said certain point aforesaid, upon the railroad
of the defendant, he saw divers persons near to that track of defendant's
railroad upon which he was at that time driving his engine, and although
he saw said Philip Bodemer, Jr., upon and between said tracks, upon
which he was at that time driving said engine, said Philip Bodemer, Jr.,
being at that time at a great distance from said engine, yet the said servant of the defendant wantonly, recklessly, and with gross negligence
drove said engine and train at a very great rate of speed along and upon
aid railroad of the defendant, and toward said Philip Bodemer, Jr., and
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toward and across said certain place, and did not make reasonable or
efficient effort to avoid causing his said engine to strike the said Philip
Bodemer, Jr., nor did he give adequate, sufficient, or timely warning to
the said Philip Bodemer, Jr., in order that he might avoid being injured
by the approach of said engine, and by and through the gross and wanton
negligence and improper conduct of the defendant, the locomotive struck
the deceased.and killed him."

The evidence showed that the engine of the defendant
was being driven much faster than was allowed by an ordinance of the city of Chicago, and that the engineer could
have seen the boy when one hundred and twenty-five feet
away from him. No bell was rung, and according to the
weight of the testimony no whistle was blown till the
engine -was within a few feet of the boy. It was admitted
that decedent was a trespasser on the tracks of- the defendant when he was killed. The other facts in the case are
set forth sufficiently in the opinion of the Court.
The Court below left it to the jury to say whether
injury was inflicted wantonly or wilfully, or with such gross
negligence as showed wilfulness. The jury found for the
plaintiff, and the defendant then took the present appeal,
assigning as error the refusal of the Court to instruct the
jury to find for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MAGRUDER,

C. J. : It is assigned as error that the trial

court refused, at the conclusion of the testimony on both
sides, to instruct the jury, as then requested by the defendant, to find for the defendant. The position of the
appellant is that the deceased was a trespasser upon its right
of way, attempting to cross the tracks where there was no
public crossing. It has been held that, where a trespasser
upon the tracks of a railroad company is injured, the company is not liable unless the injury was wantonly or-wilfully
inflicted, or was the result of such gross negligence as
evidences wilfulness. By withdrawing the first, second,
third and fourth counts from the consideration of the jury,
and submitting the case upon the fifth count, the Court assumed that the deceased was a trespasser at the time of his
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death, required the jury to find that the injury was inflicted
wantonly and wilfully, or with such gross negligence as
showed wilfulness.
The evidence of the plaintiff tended to show that there
were public street- crossings over appellant's tracks at
Twenty-sixth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-fourth Streets;
that the passenger train, which struck the deceased,
was travelling at the rate of from thirty to thirty-five
or forty miles an hour; that there were no gates
where Twenty-sixth Street crosses the tracks; that
the tracks were laid upon what was called "Clark
Street," running directly south from Twenty-second
Street ; that there were two roadways along the east and
west sides of the tracks; that there were no fences between
these roadways and the tracks; that the public drove along
these roadways, running north and south, with wagons, and
people passed up and down upon them; that wagons drive
up to the tracks upon these roadways, between Twentysixth and Twenty-fifth Streets, and unload the cars standing
there on the tracks; that "the wagons do not drive in there
between the tracks except when they are unloaded ;" that
there are houses on the east side of the tracks ; that upon
the west side of the tracks, fronting upon the strip of ground
called "Clark Street," and consisting of the two roadways
and the tracks between them, are a saloon, a rag-shop, carpet-shop, stone-yard, packing-house and ice-house, all
located between Twenty-sixth and Twenty-fifth Streets;
that many people pass there, going across the tracks to the
rag-shop and packing-house every day, and no bell was
rung on the engine of the passenger train which killed the
deceased ; that a whistle was blown twice, giving two short,
sharp sounds, when the engine of the passenger train was
about five or ten feet from the deceased, or, as some of the
witnesses express it, that the deceased was struck at the
same time when the whistle was blown; that the deceased
when struck was thrown into the air several feet; that the
engine which struck him did not stop until it reached
Twenty-fourth Street, about two blocks north of the place
of the accident; that three boys who were on an empty

OPINION OF THE COURT.

freight car standing on a track about a car length south of
Twenty-fifth Street witnessed the killing of the deceased,
and one of them saw him on the tracks before he was
struck.
We are unable to say that there was not evidence
enough to justify the Court in leaving it to the jury to say
whether or not the boy was killed by the wanton and wilful negligence of the company. The company introduced
no evidence whatever to contradict the testimony of the
plaintiff, except for the purpose of showing that the strip
of land occupied by the tracks between Twenty-fifth and
Twenty-sixth Streets was its private right of way, and not
a public street. In answer Jo written questions calling for
special findings, submitted at defendant's request, the jury
found that the tracks were straight for a considerable distance toward the south from the place of the accident; that
a locomotive approaching that place from the south could
be seen a distance of i,ooo feet; that the deceased did not
step from behind the freight train immediately in front of
the engine of the passenger train, but that he was about
X:25 feet from the engine when he stepped upon the track.
The jury answered, "We cannot say," to the question,
"Did the engineer have time to stop the train, after seeing
deceased, and before striking him ?" It was the duty of
the engineer to exercise ordinary care to avoid striking
the deceased, even if he was a trespasser. If it was impossible to stop the train in time, it may yet have been possible to have warned the plaintiff of his danger in time to
enable him to get out of the way. The engineer "must
use all the usual signals to warn the trespasser of danger."'
If the boy was 125 feet from the engine when he stepped
upon the track, did the engineer see' him ? It was for the
jury to answer this question. The company did not produce the engineer to say that he did not see the deceased,
nor did it introduce any evidence upon that subject. It is
not necessary to show by affirmative testimony that the
engineer's look was directed toward the boy. It is sufficient, if it appear from all the circumstances that he might
1 2 Shear. & R. Neg., 4th ed., 483.
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have seen him by the exercise of reasonable diligence and
ordinary prudence. Why did he not see him? The track
was straight and clear and unobstructed for a long distance.
'Others saw him. The boys on the freight car were distant
more than 125 feet, and one of them saw the deceased standing . . . on the track, right between the rails, not quite
in the middle.". If the engineer saw the boy when he was
at a distance of 125 feet, did he give him the signal of danger as soon as he ought to have given it? One witness
standing on Twenty-sixth Street, and waiting for the freight
train to pass, swears that he heard the whistle blow at the
crossing. His testimony tends to show, however, that the
engine had passed Twenty-sixth Street before the whistle
blew, and how far it had passed does'not appear. But
three witnesses swear that when the whistle sounded the
engine was near enough to strike the boy, or only five or
ten feet from him. It was for the jury to weigh this evidence, and consider its bearing. If they believed from the
evidence that the engineer saw the boy, and thereafter
waited until the sound of the whistle could do no good,
when, by whistling as soon as the deceased came upon the
tracks, he could have whrned him in time to enable him
to escape, they were justified in finding for the plaintiff.
The jury were authorized to look at the conduct of the
engineer in the light of all the facts in the case. It has
been said: "What degree of negligence the law considers
equivalent to a wilful or wanton act is as hard to define as
negligence itself, and in the nature of things is so dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case as not
to be susceptible of general statement." ' In Railroad Co.
v. Godfrey,' we Said that when a trespasser is injured, the
railroad company is liable for "such gross negligence as
evidences wilfulness."
We said the same thi-ng in Blanchard v. Railroad Co. 3 What is meant by "such gross
negligence as evidences wilfulness?"
It is "such a gross
want of care and regard for the rights of others as to justify
the presumption of wilfulness or wantonness."'
It is
2
12 Thomp. Neg., p. 1264, par. 53.
71 Ill., 500.
3126 Ill., 416.
42 Thomp. Neg., p. 1264, par. 52.
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such gross negligence as to imply a disregard of consequences, or a willingness to inflict injury.' In Harlan v.
Railroad Co., 2 it was said: "When it is said in caseswhere
plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence, that
the company is liable if by the exercise of ordinary care it
could have prevented the accident, it is to be understood
that it will be so liable if by the exercise of reasonable cate,
after a discovery by defendant of the danger in which the
injured party stood, the accident could have been prevented,
or if the company fail to discover'the danger through the
recklessness or carelessness of its employees, when the
exercise of ordinary care would have discovered the danger
Contributory negligence, such
and averted the calamity."
as that of a trespasser upon a railroad track, cannot be relied on "in any case where the action of the defendant is
wanton, wilful or reckless in the premises, and injury ensues as the result." 3 "Under the rule conceding the right
of a free track to a railway company, in the event of an injury to a trespasser upon its line, it can be held liable only
for an act which is wanton, or for gross negligence in the
management of its line, which is equivalent to intentional
mischief."' Although the plaintiff is guilty of negligence,
he can recover if the defendant could have avoided committing the injury by the exercise of ordinary care." 5
Let these principles be applied to the facts of the case
at bar. The train which committed the injury was travelling at the usual speed of thirty-five to forty miles an hour
in the crowded city of Chicago; over street-crossings; upon
unguarded tracks, so connected with a public street and so
apparently the continuation of a public street as to be regarded by ordinary citizens as located in a public street;
along a portion of such tracks where persons were known
to be passing and crossing every day; in conceded violation
of a city ordinance as to speed, and without warning of the
approach of the train by the ringing of a bell. This con265 Mo., 22.
'Deer. Neg., par. 29.
3Baameister v. Railroad Co. (Mich.), 30 N. W. Rep., 337; Bankinig
Co. v. Denison, 84 Ga., 774.
41 Thomp. Neg., 449.
'Deer. Neg., -par. 30.
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duct tended to show such a gross want of care and regard
for the rights of others as to justify the presumption of
It also tended to show that if there was
wilfulness.
failure to discover the danger of the deceased, such failure
was owing to the recklessness of the company's servants in
the management of its train. We are of the opinion that
the Court committed no error in refusing to instruct the
jury to find for the defendant.'
Appellant assigns as error the admission of testimony
that persons were in the habit of passing across the tracks
at the place where the accident occurred. In cases where
persons have travelled along a railroad right of way as a
mere footpath, using it for their own convenience, and
where there was no evidence of any assent of the railroad
company thereto except its non-interference with the practice, it has been held that such persons are to be regarded
as wrongdoers and trespassers, and that a mere naked
license or permission to enter or pass over an estate will not
create a duty or impose an obligation on the part of the
owner to provide against the danger of accident.2 But in
each of such cases it was conceded that the place where the
injury occurred was upon the right of way of the railroad
company, and that the party making use of such right of
way knew it to be the exclusive property of the railroad
company for the purpose of running its trains. But in the
case at bar the testimony of the plaintiff tended to show
that the tracks at the point where the deceased was killed
were laid in Clark Street, a public street of the city of
Chicago. There were travelled roadways constantly in use
on both sides of the tracks, and several witnesses testified
that the strip of land which embraced the tracks in the
middle and the roadways on the sides was called Clark
Street, and regarded as a public street.
When the evidence on the part of the plaintiff had
closed, the defendant introduced proofs tending to show
1
226; Railroad Co. v. Galbreath, 63
Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill.,
Ill., 436.
2 Railroad Co. v. Godfrey, 7r II., 5oo; Railroad Co. v. Blanchard, 126
510.
Ill., 416; Railroad Co. v. Hetherington, 83 Ill.,
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that the strip in question was i2o feet wide; that ioo feet in
the middle of the strip where the tracks were laid, was
railroad right of way, but that ten feet on each side of said
ioo feet belonged to the public, and were used by the public. The strip in question was used partly by the public
and partly by the railroad company. The proofs also tended
to show that for years the railroad tracks had been laid in
Clark Street as far south as Twenty-second Street, though
they had subsequently been moved somewhat to the westward. The course of the tracks southward was such as to
appear to be a mere extension of Clark Street. There was
no fence or other mark of separation to designate what portion of the strip 120 feet wide belonged to the public, and
what portion belonged to the railroad. There was proof
tending to show that before any tracks were laid at all there
bad been a footpath in use from Twenty-second Street as
far south as Twenty-fifth Street. As has already been
stated, it also appeared that persons were allowed to come
up to the cars standing upon these tracks for the purpose
of loading and unloading their wagons; and one witness
stated that wagons drove upon or between the tracks for
such purpose. The books draw a distinction between cases
where there is a mere naked license or permission to enter
upon or pass over an estate, and cases where the owner or
occupant holds out any enticement, allurement, or inducement to persons to enter upon or pass over his property.'
"A mere passive acquiescence by an owner or occupier in a
certain use of his lands by others involves no liability; but
if he, directly or by implication, induces persons to enter
on and pass over his premises, he thereby assumes an obligation that they are in a safe condition, suitable for such use;
and for a breach of this obligation he is liable to damages
to a person injured thereby."
Though it is unnecessary to
go so far as to hold in this case that the facts hereinbefore
recited amounted to an implied inducement on the part of
the railroad company to the public to pass over its tracks, it
is nevertheless quite manifest that the surroundings were
such as to give to the' tracks the appearance of being loI Sweeny v. Railroad

Co., io Allen, 368.
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cated in a public street, and all the circumstances of the
situation were such as to lead those who had occasion to
frequent that neighborhood to believe that the tracks were
in a public street; hence, we are inclined to the opinion that.
the Court did not err in admitting proof of the passing of
persons across the tracks, for the reason that such proof
was admitted before the defendant proved that the tracks
were on its right of way, and while as yet the evidence of
the plaintiff tended to show, in the absence of contradictory
proof, that the tracks were in a public street, or what was
called or regarded as a public street. If the tracks were in
a public street, the company was unquestionably under
obligations to "provide against the danger of accident" to
those rightfully thereon. After the defendant introduced
its proof, it did not move to exclude the particular testimony of the plaintiff as to the passing of persons over the
tracks. Whether, therefore, after the ownership of the
company had been shown, persons who had been proved to
be in the habit of crossing the tracks under the belief that
they were crossing a public street, were or were not such
wrongdoers as to relieve the company from liability for
injury to them, is a question which need not be further
considered.
The appellant further objects that the Court should
have excluded the ordinances as to speed and the ringing
of a bell, as these ordinances were not described in the fifth
count of the declaration.' The ordinance as to speed was
described in the third count, and the ordinance as to the
ringing of the bell was described in the fourtli count, and
they were properly admitted under these counts at the time
when they were admitted. After defendant introduced its
proof, it made no formal motion to exclude the ordinances,
though it objected to the reading of them to the jury in
the argument of plaintiff's counsel, and asked the Court to
instruct the jury to disregard them as evidence. We do
not think that the action of the Court in this particular,
even if it be regarded as technically erroneous, could have
done the defendant any harm, for the reason that counsel
1

Railroad Co. v. Godfrey, suora.
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for the defendant admitted in his opening statement to the
jury that the city ordinance prohibited the running of
trains in the city at greater rate of speed than ten miles an
hour, and also admitted that the train that killed the
deceased was travelling at a greater rate of speed than ten
miles an hour, and for the reason that the ordinance as to
the ringing of the bell was not read at all in the hearing of
the jury, and counsel for defendant allowed the testimony
that no bell was rung to be admitted without objection.
Furthermore, the action of the Court in withdrawing from
the consideration of the jury all the counts except the fifth
was exceedingly favorable to the defendant. We do not
think that the jury ought to have been told that-there
could be no recovery under the third count which described
the ordinance as to speed. Even if it be admitted that the
deceased was a trespasser, the third count was sufficient to
authorize the proof under it of such gross negligence as
evidences wilfulness. The word "reckless"
implies
heedlessness and indifference. If an engineer, knowing
that persons are accustomed to cross a track between the
streets of a large and crowded city, drives his engine forward "recklessly," that is to say, with indifference as to
*hether such persons are injured or not, and at the rate of
speed "greatly" in excess of that limited by a city ordinance, an injury thereby inflicted upon one of such persons, even though he be a trespasser, will be regarded as
the result of "such a gross want of care and regard for the
rights of others as to justify the presumption of wilfulness
and wantonness."
The views already expressed dispose of appellant's
objections to the refusal of instructions numbered 3, 4, 5
and 8, asked by the defendant. Refused instruction number 7 was not based upon the evidence. It submitted to
the jury the question whether or not the deceased was
using the tracks as a playground.. We find no evidence
in the record tending in the slightest degree to show that
the tracks were used for any such purpose. Refused
instructions numbered 9, 10, 11,

12, 15

and 17 merely

related to the degree of care which the deceased was re-
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quired to exercise; but as the case was submitted to the
jury upon a declaration which charged wanton and wilful
negligence, it made no difference to what extent the deceased was guilty of a want of care. Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is no excuse for wanton
and wilful negligence on the part of the defendant. Refused instructions numbered 24 and 25 assumed the existence
of facts about which there was a controversy, and each
singled out and gave undue prominence to a single circumstance, as characterizing the defendant's conduct, instead
of leaving it to the jury to pass upon such conduct, upon a
view of all the facts and circumstances in the case. The
judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
CRAIG

and

BAILEY, J. J.,

dissent.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
"Where the conduct of the defendant is wanton or wilful, or
where it indicates that degree of
indifference to the rights of others
which mayjustlybe characterized as
recklessness, the doctrine ofcontributory negligence has no place whatever, and the defendant is responsible for the injury he inflicts,
irrespective of the fault which
placed the plaintiff in the way of
injury:" Cooley, Law of Torts, 674.
This wanton or wilful-negligence
or recklessness is not easy to define,
nor is it easy in many cases to say
whether or not the negligence of
the particular case is such. The
injury must be deliberate or wilful, or the action which caused it
must be so reckless that the law
regards the injury resulting from
it as wilful or deliberate. If the
plaintiff is placed in a dangerous
position owing to his own negligence and the negligence of the
defendant, and the defendant then
becomes aware of the dangerous

position of the plaintiff and fails
to make every effort to avoid the
injury, the defendant's negligence
is here wilful. No amount of negligence on the part of the plaintiff
will justify the subsequent wilful
negligence on the part of the defendant in such a case.
At one extreme it is very simple.
If a man persists in walking along
a street that is closed to the public
on account of a building operation,
say, and a workman engaged at the
top of the building sees the man
on the street below, and, in spite
of that fact, drops a hodful of
broken bricks into the'street, taking the chance that the man will not
be hit, and the man is hit by apiece,
here the injured party will have his
action. True, he was guilty of contributory negligence in going on
the closed part of the street, but that
is no excuse for the action of the
workman in deliberately throwing
the bricks down on top of him, and
trusting that no one of them will

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
strike him. In a case such as this
there is no difficulty, for the injury
is wilful, or the result of an action
so reckless that the injury is treated
as if it were wilful.
But there are many cases in which
the workman threw down the bricks
without first looking, though, perhaps, he knew the street was used
by a great many people although it
was closed. Here there would not
be such a total disregard of the
rights of others, and the injury is
not so close to being wilful as in the
former case. The difficulty in these
cases lies in determining just what
negligence is such that the injury
resulting from it will be regarded
as wilful, and in determining what
cases should be left to the jury to
decide this fact. The case reported
above seems to be very close to the
border line. A review of the cases
shows that the courts of the different States do not agree in the
matter, and that the Central and
Western States are, perhaps, more
favorable to the plaintiff than the
Eastern ones. The question comes
up more often, probably, in the
case of trespassers injured on a railroad track than in any other form.
In such cases the first principle to
be remembered is that "a railroad
engineer is not bound, usually, to
foresee the wrongful presence of
any person upon the track, even
where it is open to an adjoining
highway; .". . but ifhis experience
has shown that persons are thus
constantly entering upon' the
track, . . . such persons, if injured by reason of the engineer's
failure to use ordinary care to keep
watch for them, may recover damages if the engineer could have
seen them without difficulty, had
he kept a reasonable watch, even
though, in point of fact, he did not

see them: " Shearman & Redfield
on Negligence, 4th ed.,
484.
The second principle is that "the
law presumes that a person walking
upon a railroad track will leave the
same in time to prevent injury from
an approaching train of which he
has knowledge or should have by
the ordinary use of the senses of
hearing and seeing, and the managers of the train may act upon this
presumption:"
Per STAYTON, C.
J., in I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Garcia,
75 Tex., 591. The third principle
is that "although a man may be
unlawfully on the track, may be a
trespasser, the employees of the
company would have no right to
carelessly and negligently run over
him after his presence and danger
became known to them."
Per
MAXUV, J., in Saldana v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 43 Fed.
Rep., 862. STONE, C. J., lays down
the law in such cases very clearly
in S. & N. R. R. Co. v. Black, 89
Ala, 313. A person on a track
must-employ his eyes and ears to
discover an approaching train, and
if he fail to do so he is guilty of
contributorynegligence. When the
engineer discovers a person on the
track who from appearances is a
person of discreet years, he is justified in supposing that such person
will see or hear the locomotive and
get off the track, and hence in such
a case he is not bound to stop or
check the train in the absence of
other attendant circumstances. The
engineer can act on this supposition until circumstances make it
apparent that the trespasser is not
aware of the approach of the train,
or is unable to extricate himself
from the peril. But when the engineer discovers that the trespasser
is unaware of the approach of the
train, or cannot leave the track,
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he must use every endeavor to avert
the catastrophe by stopping the
train. In this case the decedent,
who was deaf, was a trespasser on
the tracks at a place where they
were straight for nearly a mile, and
the engineer saw him half a mile
away. When the train was two
hundred yards from him the bell
was rung, and when within one
hundred the whistle blown; and
then the engineer, noticing that
decedent did not look around or
get off the track, reversed the engine, but the decedent was killed.
The Court held that the question of
the defendant's wilful negligence
was for the jury, under instructions
embodying the principles laid down
above.
In the case of Central R. R. &
Banking Co. v. Denson, 84 Ga., 774,
plaintiff's decedent was walking
along defendant's track, and a train
of defendant came up from behind
him at a place where defendant's
servants could have seen decedent
400 yards away. No warning was
given decedent by bell or whistle,
nor was an effort made to check the
speed of the train till it was but a
few feet from decedent, when the
whistle was blown twice, and about
the same instant decedent was
struck and killed. Held: Defendant was "guilty of gross, wilful
and
and culpable negligence,"
plaintiff could recover in spite of
decedent's contributory negligence.
See also Central R. R. & Banking
Co. of Georgia v. Vaughan, 9 So.
Rep., 468.
In Hyde v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.,
26 Pac. Rep., 979 (Utah), a child,
who was a trespasser, fell asleep on
the defendant's track. The engineer saw the child, when he was
between two and three hundred
yards away, but could not make out
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what it was till within thirty feet,
when he endeavored to stop the
train. Here it was held that the
child's father could recover. See,
also, Keyser v. Railway Co., 56
Mich., 559; Gunn v. Ohio River
R. R. Co., 14 South East Rep.,
465 (West Va.). A higher degree
of care is demanded of the railroad
company when the trespasser is a
child than when he is a grown
person : Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Whipple, 39 Kan., 531. In this
case the plaintiff recovered.
Detaching cars from the engine
and letting them run by themselves
with so few brakemen that they
cannot be stopped promptly, if necessary, is wilful negligence: Georgia Pacific Ry. Co. v. O'Shields,
90 Ala., 29; Patton v. Railway Co.,
89 Tenn., 370; Schumacher v. St.
Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 39 Fed Rep.,
174 (U. S. C. C., W. D. of Ark.).
In Conley v. C. N. 0. & T. P.
Ry. Co., 12 Southwest. Rep., 7Z4
(Ken.), a detached portion of a train
was allowed to go by itself with no
bell, lights or other signal of its
approach, nor any one to look out
for people on its track, and the defendant was held liable for the death
of a person killed on the track.
In Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v.
Sampson, 8 South. Rep., 778 (Alabama), plaintiff sued for damages
for injury to his mule and wagon,
caused by an engine of the defendant. The track along which the
engine came was hidden by a building, but there was an open space of
twelve feet between the track and
the building. Plaintiff did not stop
to listen, and drove on the track
when the engine was distant but
thirty feet, and his mule and wagon
were injured in the collision that
followed. The evidence was conflicting as to how fast the mule was
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going, how fast the engine was goIn Atkyn v. Wabash Ry. Co., 4L
ing-the witnesses varied from six
Fed. Rep., 193, a statute of Ohio
and a half to sixteen miles an hour
enacted that a railroad company
-as to whether the engine had a
should "adjust, fill or block the
head-light, and as to whether it
frogs, switches and guard-rails oil
gave the signals. An ordinance
its tracks" ... for the safety of its
limited the speed of trains to eight
employees. Held: That the failmiles an hour at the place of the ure of a railroad company to comaccident. Held: That the circumply with this law was not such "a
stances were such that the Court reckless disregard of its duty" as
properly refused to direct a verdict
to make it liable for an accident
for the defendant.
caused by this failure to comply
In Piper v. C. M. & St. P. Ry.
with the law, in spite of the conCo., 46 N. W. Rep., 165 (Wis.),
tributory negligence of the plainplaintiff while going over defend- tiff, an employee.
ant's tracks ata crossing, was struck
In Givens v. Kentucky Central
by a train going thirty-six miles an
R. R. Co., 15 Southwest. Rep., 1057
hour, though the statutory speed
(Kentucky), plaintiff's decedent, a
was but six miles an hour. When
boy nine years old, was killed in
between fifty and sixty feet from
passing over defendant's railroad
the track plaintiff looked for trains
track at a place which was neither
and saw none, and if the train which
a public highway nor a usual crossstruck him had not been going
ing place, though within the limits
faster than the statute allowed, he of a village. A freight train had
would have crossed in safety. No just passed, and the decedent, withsignal was given, and the brakes
out seeing the engine and tender
were not applied till the train was which immediately followed it, runnear the crossing. When the plainning backward, went upon the track
tiff was within forty-eight feet of
and was killed. The engine was
track, the engineer could have
not going faster than a man could
seen him when the train was 1235
walk, and the son of the engineer
feet away, and the train could have
in charge of the engine could not
been stopped in 6oo feet. Held:
see the decedent because of the tenThat under all the circumstances it
der. Held: That a binding charge
was a question for the jury, and
in favor of the defendant was proper.
that a verdict for the plaintiffwould
See, also, Tennis v. I. C. R. T. Ry.
stand. See, also, C. C. C. & I. Ry.
Co., 25 Pac. Rep., 876 (Kan.). See,
Co. v. Harrington, 3o Northeast.
also, Spicer v. Ches. & Ohio R. R.
Rep., 37 (Indiana).
Co., 34 W. Va., 514.
The deafness of the trespasser
In Woodruff v. Northern Pacific
does not change the duty of the enR. R. Co., 47 Fed. Rep., 689, it was
gineer, unless he is aware of this
held that where a train is not going
fact or has reason to presume it
at an unlawful rate of speed it is not
from the action of the trespasser:
wilful negligence for an engineer
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Black, 89 Ala.,
not to see a trespasser on the rail313; AVERY, J., in Meredith v. R.
road company's track, though "by
& D. R. R. Co., 1o8 N. C., 616.
ordinary care and vigilance " he
In the following cases the neglimight have discovered the tresgence of the defendant's employee
passer in time to have avoided the
was held not to be wilful :
injury.

